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, IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REX PACE, BYRON PACE, KEITH PACE
AND HARVEY PACE
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E. PARRISH
Defendants and Appellants.

Appellant's Reply Brief
CASE NO. 7677
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L. TOM PERRY,
PRESTON AND HARRIS,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State of Utah, in and for the County of Cache.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REX P.ACE, BYRON P.\CE, KEITH PACE·
AND H.\R\'EY PACE
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
YS.

JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E. PARRISH
Defendants and Appellants.

INTRODUCTION
A few comments on the brief submitted by respondents seem necessary.
POINT I: APPELLANT'S BRIEF CONTAINED A
FAIR STATEMENT OF THE IMPORTANT FACTS IN
THE CASE ...
A. There was no intention of misleading the Court
when we made the statement that plaintiffs had contracted
to sell their farm in Boeneta, Utah, for $50,000.00. The
record is clear on this point, ( Tr. 28). If there was only an
offer and not a contract, we apologize for our lack of care
in setting forth this relatively unimportant matter.
We think that plaintiffs also, in the heat of their
argument, unintentionally colored other facts. On page
16 of their brief, they have Mr. Parrish standing at point
A and pointing to the Rollin's land, whereas the testimony
3
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shows that they were all seated in the car when Parrish
is alleged to have said, "Brethren, all the land you see
down there belong to me," ( 'fr. 32).
Likewise, on the top of the next page of their brief,
plaintiffs would have us believe that the Rollin's tract of
11% acres, ~~mile away was "the most clearly visible tract
of land in their view," they represent that a tract of land
7~ mile away was more clearly visible to the parties than
the land surrounding the car in which they were seated.
_B. We are accused of attempting to mislead the
,Court by- failing to make reference to a statement of one
Reynolds Blackington to the effect, "If the deal went
through, the reservoir went with the place." This accusa-tion deserves more serious consideration.
We admit that the Blackington statement was denied
a place in our brief. Our reason was-.- It did not deserve
serious .consideration.
It was Blackington, friend of Rex Pace, who remained
in the car while Rex inquired of the defendants if their
land was for sale. It was Blackington who said that
Parrish, crippled as he was, walked out of the house, down
the steps_ and out to the car to discuss a deal that had
already bee? ]Jlaqe. It was witness Blackington who conviently overheard this one single statement (now relied
up by respondents) as the most vital in thi's entire dispute.
It was Blackington' whom Parrish testified he ·had never
seen prior to the date of the trial. It was Blackinton who
overheard a -statement that was neither pleaded nor testified to by either of the plaintiffs.
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We suggest that the statement is very similar to the
statement that the reservoir is on my land. It is not a
direct statement that, "all of the water rights in the reservoir are used on my land;,;, or, "that I own all the water
rights.~' For the puropse of establishing fraud ·there
should be a distinction between a reservoir itself and the
water rights in that reservoir. So first the statement has
to be enlarged to make the reservoir include all the water
rights in the reservoir. But the plaintiffs' own evidence
is that they could not put to benefical use more than half
the water rights from the reservoir in this farm, ( Tr. 48).
Plaintiff is here attempting to establish fraud by producing
a witness who is willing to put the general statement in
the mouth of the defendant that the "reservoir went with
the place." It should be remembered that such a statement is very easy to make but it goes all too far. The
plaintiff had no right to believe it under the circumstances
any more than he had a right to establish fraud by the
statement, ''I own all the land you can see down there."
The slightest investigation would have shown there were
neighbors to the land, that the ditches from the reservoir
reached the premises of the neighbors and that part of
the water rights in the reservoir were owned by these
same neighbors.
May we not be pardoned for thinking this testimony
of little importance? Even plaintiff realizes its weakness,
for he feels the need of it needing support by inserting
something entirely foreign to the record. That the Jury,
"Were undoubtedly aware of Mr. Blackington's reputation
for truth and honesty."
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C. If, "Respondents absolutely never examined the
river bottom land in section 19," then what is the meaning
of their testimony, ( Tr. 60) where they testify they rode
over the river bottom land twice and got out and made an
inspection of the river bottom land? If they never examined
the land, how did they know that it had never been
plowed? (Tr. 45), and that it was covered with sage?
(Tr. 46).
D. On page 4 of respondents' brief, they say they
made no request for special interrogatories, but on page 41,
of the same brief, they say they requested them.
(A. 37-41 ).
For the most part, the issues are 'Clearly set forth in
the principal brief. We assert error, and they deny it.
Where the issues are thus clearly set forth, there is no
need of further comment.
But on page 13 of their brief, a new doctrine is introduced. Respondents contended that there may be fraud
and deceit by innuendo. We submit that if the doctrine
of fraud and deceit by innuendo ever finds a place in the
jurisprudence of this State, it should not be introduced
when mature men are making a land contract.
The· second new element introduced by respondents
is a statement of the general rule that where a confidential
relationship exists, fraud may be practiced by suppressing
facts, or by the telling of a half truth. The insertion of
-this new element in the case is at least a tacit admission
by the plaintiffs that there was no actual, direct misrepresentation.
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'Ve find no fault with this general statement of a law,
even though it cannot be found at 23 Am. Jur. 956. We
differ \Vith respondents in their application of this general
rule to the facts in the instant case.

POINT II: THERE WAS NO CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE
CONTRACT ...
Was there a confidential relationship existing between
_these parties? The only. evidence cited by respondents in
their brief is that the defendant called the plaintiffs
''brethren." Surely the Court is not going to lay down a
. rule of la\v for this state, that when ever one party calls
the other 'brother" a confidential relationship exists.
\Ve find that Courts have upheld that a confidential
relationship exists in case of dealings between physician
and client, land broker and agent, and, in some cases,
where director and stockholder are dealing with each
other. Where Bolander vs. Thompson, 134 Pac. 2nd, 924,
a patient and nurse were dealing with each other, and in
Anderson vs. Lloyd, 139 P. 2nd 244, former partners were
dealing with each other, in Baker vs. Baker, 171 A.L.R.
447, a divorced couple were dealing with each other. In
all these cases, under the circumstances, the Court found
a confidential relationship, but these cases are entirely
.. different from strangers dealing with each other, and one
·calling the other "brother."
POINT III: THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR DE·CEIT
BY WILFUL CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
OR STATEMENT OF A HALF TRUTH ...
Assuming no confidential relationship, is there deceit
by wilful concealment of material facts?
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THE RESERVOIR
Suppose we refer to the general picture. A tentative
agreement had been made between Rex Pace and Joseph
A. Parrish for the sale of the Parrish farm. This agreement
was to be binding, if approved by the father and the other
two sons, after an inspection of the farm. Three plaintiffs,
all matured men, one from Ogden, a nearby town, and the
others from Duchesne County, in the same state, all experienced in operating irrigated land, call on the owner,
and aged farmer, 75 years of age, and invite him to accompany them on an inspection trip. In the course of
their inspection, they come to a large, man-made reservoir
and there, according to the plaintiff, ( Tr. 30), Parrish
simply said, "This is the reservoir." In that simple statement, there. was no wilful concealment of material facts .
or the wilful telling of a half truth. Was the defendant
under any duty, because of this casual statement, to go
on and explain that others had an interest in the water in
the reservoir, when that question was never put to him?
Admitting, but not concealing, there was another discussion as to the ownership of the reservoir on a previous
occasion. Was there a wilful concealment of a material
fact in that first interview?
This is the testimony: Question by Mr. Fuller, "Was
there any discussion relative to how much water was on
the place?" Answer by Rex Pace, he said, "I own the
reservoir; the reservoir is on my place."
We know nothing of the circumstances surrounding
this statement. The record is silent as to what question
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called for such a reply. Knowing nothing of the circumstances, can 've charge defendant with a wilful concealnlent of a material fact.
An another occasion, prior to the signing of the agreement, three of the plaintiffs were conversing with Wallace
Parrish concerning the construction of the reservoir. There
was a frank and complete revelation of all of the facts.
"\Vallace told them that others had an interest in the
reserYoir, (Tr. 165, 168, 170).

If respondents had listened to Wallace Parris? they
would have known; if, in that six weeks period between
the inspection trip and the signing of the contract they
had investigated, they would have found out; and if they
had inquired of defendant, Joseph A. Parrish, at any time,
they would have been told, that others had a right to use
some of the water in the reservoir.
Having neither listened, investigated, or inquired,
they cannot now complain.
THE ROLLIN'S LAND
The position of the parties, when the alleged statement was made concerning the Rollin's land, is important,
and that fact is in dispute. Parrish remembers pointing to
a tract of cultivated land on the sidehill and making a
.statement concerning the land he owned as the parties
ascended the road to the reservoir, ( Tr. 129). He is positive that the parties did not drive to point "A" during
the inspection, (Tr. 141). The physical facts support his
statement; the road around Rollin's field was too muddy to
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travel, if this road was too muddy, how could the parties
have ascended to point "A" where there was little or no
road? If they were at the point fixed by Mr. Parrish, there
is no deception for the Rollin's tract would not be in the
direction of his pointing.

If, however, in their eagerness to win, plaintiffs have
used a simple expedient of changing the place of conversation to a different point, and reported that the parties
were facing downhill instead of uphill, then there is
something to argue abount, otherwise not.
In a fraud case, the burden of proof is on the parties
asserting the fraud. Is that burden shifted when there
is a direct conflict in the evidence? Is the burden shifted
when the facts argue for the defendant? It must be remembered that it was the plaintiffs who were eager to
buy, and not the defendants who were eager to sell; there
is no motive for a wilful concealment.
Further comment is necessary only to show_ the weakness of plaintiffs' position. It is only when one party cannot ascertain the facts that a wilful concealn1ent bv the
other becomes fradulent. "It is a general rule of fraud
that nondisclosure can form the basis of a charge of fraud
only if there is a duty of disclosure. Accordingly, where
the facts or means of information concerning the condition
and value of the land are equally accessible to both the
vendor and the purchaser, and nothing is said or done
.by the vendor which tends to impose on the purchaser, or
' to mislead him, there is no fraud which the law can notice
arising from the failure of the vendor to disclose facts affecting the value of the land. (55 Am. Jur. 531).
.I
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The parties \Vere out on an inspection tour. If the
inclusion of the Rollin's tract was of vital importance, as
contended by plaintiffs, they would have walked to the
Rollin's tract and used tl1e shovel as they did in the South
field. Fraud is never presumed. We must assume that if
the plaintiffs had even started toward the Rollin's tract,
there \Vould have been no misunderstanding ~or they
would have been told the truth, or had they even inquired
\vhether the Rollin's tract belonged to Parrish when they
drove near to it, they would have been told the true condition and there would have been no deceit. Having made
no inquiry or given any indication that they thought the
Rollin's land was included in the land to be sold, they
cannot now complain.
It must also be remembered that Wallace Parrish, son
of the vendor, testified that on the six hour ride, prior to
signing the contract, he told them that his father no longer
o\vned the 11~ acres. (Tr. 166-157).
RIVER BOTTOM LAND
Plaintiffs are either confused as to the exact location
of the river bottom land or they are deliberately attempting to mislead the Court. Whether confusion or intentional unfairness the evidence is clear that the road over
which the parties traveled twice while on the_ inspection
trip runs directly through the river bottom land.
In the course of the cross examination of Rex Pace
he appeared to be a little confused and his attorney
prompted him by asking:
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"Q. The river bottom land?
A.

That is right.

Q. You went over the river bottom land twice?
A.

Along this road, yes."

Attorney Perry then continued his cross-examination.

"Q. You got out of the car and made an inspection
of the river bottom land?
A.

Yes sir.

Q. There was no snow on the ground?
A.

No sir." (Tr. 59-60).

For plaintiff to argue now that the river bottom land
was "east some distance" from the road over which they
had twice traveled seems very unfair.
In a desperate attempt to sustain the verdict they
present a new an unusual argument. That fraud may be
practiced on another by a secret thought that is unexpressed.
This is the argument: That while the parties were
on that inspection trip and Rex Pace was telling Parrish,
that they were going "to push down the trees" and farm
that portion of the river bottom land that was west of the
road, Parrish thought "Maybe they will and maybe they
won't." ( Tr. 133). There can be no deceit because of
this thought.
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If he had told thein it was· good farming land when
he had never plowed it, and it later proved deficient, he
'vould have practiced deceit. If he had told them it was
incapable of being farmed when he had never tried it,
he would likewise have been in error.
The case of Farrer vs. Churchhill, 135 U.S. 609, 34 L.
Ed., 246 seems in point and this issue. In this case, plaintiff alleged damages because defendant had misrepresented the amount of land overflowed by the Mississippi
River, the Court denied relief because plaintiff had inspected the property. In the opinion, the Court quoted
from an early English case of Hill vs. Thompson. Thompson had sold a tract of land to Hill and he had reported
that only 50 to 60 acres were untillable, whereas 300 acres
were unfit for cultivation, the Court refused to grant relief. An examination had been made by the vendee. The
Court, .in its opinion, said:
"Misrepresentation entitled to relief must be in reference to some .material thing unknown to the purchaser,
either from not being examined, or for want of opportunity
to be informed, or for entire confidence reposed in the
vendor: and a concealment of material facts known to the
vendor and unknown to the vendee, which are calcuJated
to influence the action or operate to the prejudice of the
vendee; if fradulent.
But where the facts be equally open to both parties,
with equal opportunities of examinatiol}, _and .the vendee
undertakes to examine for himself, without relying on the
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statements of the vendor, it is not evidence of fraud that
the vendor knows facts not known to the vendee and does
not disclose them to him."
The judgment should be reversed.
Respectively submitted,
L. TOM PERRY,
PRESTON AND HARRIS,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.
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